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Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees:
Reconciling Judicial Responsibility With Executive
Discretion
For nearly eighty years' the Department of Justice has disposed of
civil antitrust suits through settlement negotiations followed by entry of
a consent decree.2 Since its first use, the consent decree has become
entrenched as the most potent 3 and oft used enforcement tool available
to the government.4 While no statute expressly authorizes5 the government to employ the consent decree as a means of terminating civil
antitrust litigation, the Supreme Court has affirmed the power of the
6
Attorney General to agree to a valid decree.
Although the terms of the proposed consent decree are negotiated
between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the
defendant, the actual entry of the decree, and thus its final acceptance,
is a judicial act. 7 Since a decree, once entered, is a judgment, it has the
same legal effect as a judgment entered following a fully litigated action.8 The degree to which a court ought to scrutinize the proposed
I. The first consent decree was entered in 1906. See United States v. Otis Elevator
Co., 1 Decrees & Judgments in Fed. Antitrust Cas. 107 (N.D. Cal. 1906).
2. On consent decrees, see generally Flynn, Consent Decreesin Antitrust Enforcement:
Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53 IowA L. REv.983 (1968); Isenbergh & Rubin, Antitrust
Enforcement Through Consent Decrees, 53 HARV. L. REV.386 (1940); Kalodner, Consent
Decrees as an Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 277 (1978); M. Goldberg,
The Consent Decree: Its Formulation and Use (Occasional Paper No. 8,Bureau of Bus. &
Econ. Research, Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Mich. St. Univ. 1962).
3. Kalodner, supra note 2, at 313.
4. REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSENT DaCREE PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-9 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as 1959 HOUSE REPORT]; W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-97 (TNEC
Monograph No. 16, 1940); Donovan & McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of
FederalAnti-TrustLaws, 46 HARv. L. RV.885, 895 n.3 (1933); Flynn, supra note 2, at 983.
5. Before the enactment of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (APPA), 15
U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982), only § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), mentioned consent judgments. Even the APPA does not expressly authorize the government to
settle civil antitrust cases by consent decree; rather, the legislation accepts the widespread
use of consent decrees as afait accompli.
6. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1928).
7. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).
8. Since the terms of a consent decree are negotiated between the parties, a consent
decree is similar to a contract in many respects. However, "[u]nlike a private agreement, a
consent decree, once it has been accepted by a court, has the same legal effect as a judgment
in a fully litigated decree. After entry, the legal effect of an antitrust consent decree on the
rights of the parties, including the rights of the Government, are adjudicatory rather than
[133]
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decree before its entry has been a matter of controversy. 9 The courts
themselves have been unable to agree on a proper standard for review, 10 and much of the guidance provided by the Supreme Court consists of dicta in cases in which third parties were denied intervenor
status to contest entry of the decree."'
In an effort to provide a procedural structure for the consent decree process, Congress enacted the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act (APPA) in 1974.12 In doing so, Congress expressly provided that
before a district court enters a proposed consent decree, it must determine that the decree is "in the public interest."' 3 To assist the courts in
their efforts to make this public interest determination, Congress identified several factors that the courts, in their discretion, could consider. 14
However, neither the statute nor the legislative history provides a clear
indication of the standard by which the courts are to assess the public
interest.
This Note analyzes the standards applied by the courts in their
review of consent decrees before the enactment of the APPA, the congressional intent in passing the legislation, and the standards that
courts have applied since its enactment. The Note also explores the
implications of the new and ill-advised standard applied by the district
court in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 15 The
Note concludes that a satisfactory analytical formula for reviewing
consent decrees has yet to be firmly established by the cases. It proposes a workable standard of review that will allow the courts to simultaneously make an independent determination that the proposed
decree is in the public interest, preserve the consent decree as a viable
enforcement tool, and accord the Department of Justice the discretion
it needs to enforce the antitrust laws.
contractual in nature." 1959 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3. See also United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1972).
9. For criticisms of the judicial role in the consent decree process, see 1959 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 4, at x; M. GREEN, B. MOORE, JR. & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE NADER
ANTITRUST STUDY GROUP REPORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 339-407 (1972) [hereinafter cited as THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM]; W.

HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 4, at 88-97; Flynn, supra note 2, at 988-1003; Kalodner,

supra note 2, at 279-84. Cf. Handler, Antitrust-Myth andReality in an Inflationary Era, 50
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 211, 239-44 (1975).
10. See infra notes 111-54 & accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 36-37 & accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974). The procedural portions with which this
Note is concerned are codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982). The legislation is also popularly known as the Tunney Act.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982).
14. Id. § 16(e)(l)-(2). See infra note 86.
15. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd without opinionsub nom Maryland v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
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Review Standards Before the APPA
The power and duty to enforce the antitrust laws are vested in the
Attorney General. I6 Inherent in this enforcement power is the subtantial degree of discretion required if the Attorney General, through the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, is to implement the
antitrust enforcement policies of the executive branch. The Division
must decide not only which cases to initiate, but also which should be
litigated and which should be settled to achieve optimal antitrust en-7
forcement, particularly given the limited resources of the Division.'
Since Swift & Co. v. UnitedStates,'8 the Supreme Court has recognized
that the discretion of the Attorney General is necessarily broad. 19
As the consent decree became the vehicle by which many civil actions brought by the Antitrust Division were resolved, 20 commentators
2
began to recognize the enforcement potential of the consent decree 22'
and, at the same time, the uncertain scope of the Division's power.
The government decided not only which cases to initiate but also disposed of many suits by means of a judicially enforceable negotiated
settlement. The decision to settle and the terms of the consent decree
were arrived at by an essentially administrative process conducted
without administrative guarantees. 23 The only potential check on the
terms of a proposed consent decree came in the form
of a review by the
court before it accepted and entered the decree. 24
While the Department of Justice formally recognized the role of
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1982). The United States Attorneys, under the direction of the
Attorney General, are required to "institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain"
antitrust violations. Id.
17. Antitrust Proceduresand PenaltiesAct: Hearingson S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust andMonopoly ofthe Senate Comnr on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 81, 118 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Consent Decree Bills: Hearings on H.R. 9203, H.. 9947, and S. 782 Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and CommercialLaw of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
46 (1973) (testimony of Sen. Tunney) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. At the time the
APPA became law, the annual budget for the Antitrust Division was $13 million. House
Hearings,supra, at 46. See also 1959 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9.
18. 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
19. Id. at 331. "His authority to make determinations includes the power to make
erroneous decisions as well as correct ones." Id. at 332.
20. Between 1935 and 1955, 72% of the Justice Department's civil cases were terminated by consent decree. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS 360 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT]. See also 1959 HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
21. W. HAMILTON & 1. TILL, supra note 4, at 88-89; Donovan & McAllister,supra note
4, at 911-16; Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 2, at 390-92.
22. Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 2, at 404-05; Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon
ofAntitrust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34, 50 (1950).
23. 1959 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 15; Flynn, supra note 2, at 1008-09.
24. 1959 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
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the courts in the consent decree process2 5 and a few courts aggressively

performed as independent protectors of the public interest, 26 trial
courts infrequently questioned the terms of a decree presented by the
government.2 7 The Antitrust Division continued to settle an increasing

number of civil cases by consent decree, 28 thus acting in accord with its
basic policy decision to utilize the consent decree to maximize its endeferred to
forcement efforts.2 9 The reviewing district court routinely
30
interest.
public
the
of
assessment
the government's
Following the 1956 entry of the consent decree in the govern-

ment's initial suit against American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
Congress investigated not only the entry of that consent decree, but the
entire settlement program of the Department of Justice. After conducting extensive hearings, the House Antitrust Subcommittee pre-

pared a report highly critical of the manner in which the Department of

Justice conducted its consent decree program. 3 1 The report also concluded that the judicial review of proposed consent decrees was at best
33
cursory, 32 even though a decree often affected an entire industry.
While the report presented explicit recommendations for reform of the
Department of Justice procedures, 34 it provided no guidance to the
25. The 1938 Report of the Attorney General stated that the Department of Justice
would submit all consent decree proposals "to an impartial judicial tribunal and thus be
guided by the judgment of the court before [the government] takes final action." Quoted in
Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 2, at 408 n.70.
26. United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943). The court was actually considering a government motion, opposed by the defendants, to vacate a previously entered decree. The court held, however,
that when it considered a motion to modify or vacate a decree, it had the same duty to make
an independent public interest determination as it did when considering the initial entry of a
decree. Id. at 656. In an earlier action involving the same decree, a different judge had also
recognized that a proposed decree must be in the public interest before acceptance by the
court. See United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 3 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D. Del. 1933).
27. 1959 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14; W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 4, at
88; Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 2, at 408-09.
28. See supra note 20.
29. 1959 HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9.
30. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950); United
States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 186 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1960), appealdismissedsub nom.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 364 U.S. 518 (1960). "The Government is
concerned with the public interest and is satisfied that the conduct [complained of by the
applicant for intervention] is not against that interest." Id. at 777.
31. 1959 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4. The committee determined that the principal
officials of the Justice Department had abdicated their duty in accepting the 1956 AT&T
decree. 1d. at 293. The committee labeled the decree a "blot on the enforcement history of
the antitrust laws," id., and concluded that the consent decree practice of the Antitrust Division had "established an orbit in the twilight zone between established rules of administrative law and judicial procedures," id. at 15.
32. Id. at 14-15.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id. at 304.
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courts to help them formulate an appropiate standard of review. 35
Two years after the House Antitrust Subcommittee issued its report, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad discretion
vested in the Attorney General and the Antitrust Division. Writing for
36
a unanimous court in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, Justice Harlan stated:
Apart from anything else, sound policy would strongly lead us to
decline appellants' invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim of bad
faith or malfeasance
37
on the part of the Government in so acting.
Although the language was dicta, it provided the lower courts with a
clear indication of the Supreme Court's views about the relative roles
of the court and the Department of Justice in the consent decree
process.
The lower court opinions that came after Sam Fox Publishing reflected an attempt by the judiciary to reconcile the broad discretionary
authority of the Attorney General, as recognized by the Supreme
Court, with the responsibility to make an independent determination of
a decree's impact on the public interest. Procedural changes made by
the Antitrust Division3 8 gave courts more time between the proposal of
a decree and its entry. 39 The courts used the extra time to receive the
views of third parties, ordinarily through their application for intervention. 40 Nonetheless, the proper standard for court review remained
elusive.
A significant part of the problem faced by trial courts attempting
to formulate a standard of review was the lack of precedent. Although
the Expediting Act 4 ' allows direct appeals from civil antitrust judgments to the Supreme Court, the high court has written only two opin35. Even if the report had made recommendations, they would not have been binding
without the enactment of legislation.
36. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
37. Id. at 689.
38. 28 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1973).
39. The regulations established a period of 30 days between the proposal of a decree
and its entry. Id See infra note 45.
40. See United States v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
afdper curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United
States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affid sub nom. Thrifty
Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968); United States v. CIBA Corp., 50
F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). At least one court received numerous comments from third
parties who did not seek to intervene. United States v. Ling-Temo-Vought, Inc., 315 F.
Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
41. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 554, § 1, 32 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1982)). Before 1974, a judgment in any civil antitrust action brought by the United
States was appealable only to the Supreme Court. However, after a 1974 amendment, Pub.
L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1709 (1974), direct appeal to the Supreme Court lies only when the
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ions concerning the consent decree process 42 since its 1961 Sam Fox
Publishing decision. Neither of these opinions dealt directly with the
appropriate public interest review standard to be applied by the trial
courts. Before 1975, the courts of appeals dealt with the subject only
infrequent attempts at guidance
occasionally and indirectly. These
43
were cursory and inconsistent.
In addition to the lack of precedent, reviewing courts often found
themselves with little information on which to base a public interest
determination. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act44 provides that a consent judgment shall have no prima facie effect against the defendant in
subsequent private litigation, provided that the decree is entered before
any testimony is taken. This statutory provision provides the government with a powerful lever and the defendant with a significant inducement to settle the case before trial.45 Consequently, judges ordinarily
had no evidentiary basis upon which to make an informed decision and
were accordingly forced to rely on stipulations or oral statements of the
parties.4 6 Although there seems to be little doubt that the courts had
the power to hold hearings on the decree if they so chose,47 there was
little point to such proceedings absent a serious charge by a third party
that the decree was inequitable. One commentator has concisely articulated the dilemma:
district court certifies the case as "of general public importance in the administration of
justice." 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (1982).
42. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971) (interpretation of the terms of
a consent decree); United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964) (the Supreme
Court vacated a consent decree entered by the trial court over the objection of the government). Cascade Nat. Gas v. El Paso Nat. Gas, 386 U.S. 129 (1967), was also decided during
this period. However, the opinion dealt with a peculiar fact situation in which orders previously entered by the Supreme Court had not been followed. The opinion was not read by
commentators or courts as an expression of consent decree policy by the high court. See
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The
Twenty- Third AnnualAntitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1971).
43. Two Ninth Circuit opinions, handed down less than a year apart, illustrate the
mixed signals sent by the courts of appeals. Compare Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1965) (a consent decree "must be scrutinized carefully and approved,
both as to form and content, by the court entering it, prior to such entry"), with City of
Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1964) (although the trial court
must approve the decree, "[t]his approval is not necessarily, but from a practical standpoint
is, a foregone conclusion").
44. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
45. The government often presented the decree at the same time it filed the complaint.
1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 20, at 360.
46. United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See infra notes 59-60 & accompanying text.
47. United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mo. 1975),
afi'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nora. National Farmers' Org. v. United States,
429 U.S. 940 (1976); Note, The IYT Dividend- Reform ofDepartment ofJustice Consent Decree Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 594, 630-31 (1973).
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Is the court supposed to second-guess the Department of Justice, to
retrace all the tortuous steps the Department has traversed in reaching agreement with the defendant, and to make an independent assessment of the minimal relief which the public interest demands?
How can this be done without a full dress hearing and how will such
48
a hearing differ from the trial which the parties are trying to avoid?
The district courts attempted to construct a variety of analytical
formulas in an effort to comply with their apparently inconsistent obligations to independently review a proposed decree and yet respect the
discretion of the Antitrust Division. One of the first cases after Sam
Fox Publishingin which the trial court opinion included a fully developed analysis of the public interest issue was United States v. Carter
Products, Inc. 49 There the court described its function as deciding
50
whether entering the decree as proposed would be "equitable"; if it
5
1
was, the decree should ordinarily be approved. The court balanced
two factors: the benefits of the decree to the public and the consenting
defendant and the abridgment of contractual rights alleged by the
third-party opponent of the decree.5 2 The court reasoned that when a
decree afforded the government "substantially the same relief' '5 3 that it
would have obtained after a trial, the public would benefit by the immediate elimination of the offensive conduct charged in the complaint
without the necessity of a time consuming and expensive trial.5 4 The
defendant benefited by eliminating the risk of an adverse judgment and
its consequential prima facie effect. In the face of these weighty considerations, the contractual claim of the third party provided the court
5
with insufficient reason to withhold approval of the decree.:
The public interest inquiry of another court, in United States v.
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,56 focused on the protection of non-litigant
third parties. Although it alluded to many of the same public interest
factors considered by other courts,5 7 the Ling-Temco-Vougk6t court's
public interest analysis was reduced to consideration of the concerns
presented by employees and pensioners of one of the defendant's sub48. Handler, supra note 42, at 21.
49. 211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
50. Id. at 147.
51. Id. at 148.
52. The third party was actually a non-consenting defendant in the action who alleged
that entry of the decree would invade, without judicial determination, its rights under a
contract with the consenting co-defendant. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The government agreed to drop the suit against the third party, id. at 148 n.7, and
the court allowed the third party to petition for inclusion of a provision in the decree that
would clarify that the decree itself determined no contractual rights between the consenting
defendant and the non-consenting (third-party) defendant, id. at 150.
56. 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
57. See infra note 69 & accompanying text.
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sidiaries subject to divestiture under the terms of the decree.5 8 The

court conceded that, in the absence of a complete record from which to
make a public interest determination, it had to rely on the assurances of
the government that the decree met the economic and public interest
objectives of the antitrust statutes.5 9 The court approved the proposed

decree subject to the submission by the parties of an acceptable method
60
of safeguarding the employee benefit and pension funds involved.

Other courts placed significant emphasis on the importance of the
consent decree process to the government's antitrust enforcement effort.
The relief often may have been somewhat less than the government
could have obtained had it prevailed at trial, but a consent decree
avoided prolonged, resource-draining litigation. 6' In United States v.
Blue Chp Stamp Co. ,62 even though the court initially rejected the decree proposed by the government, it noted that the consent decree

played an indispensable role in antitrust enforcement and quoted the

language 63 from Sam Fox Publishing.64
In United States v. Automobile Manufacturers Association,65 the

court found implicit congressional approval for the consent decree as a

means of enforcing the antitrust laws.6 6 The court drew a distinction
between the administrative discretion vested in the Antitrust Division
and the discretion based on legal considerations that provided a foun-

dation for the court's power to disapprove a proposed decree. The ad58. None of the employees or pensioners sought to intervene. Their views were expressed to the court through correspondence. Id. at 1309.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1310. See also United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
where the court also acknowledged that its limited resources hampered its opportunity to
scrutinize the proposed decree. It relied on the presence of applicants for intervention and
the "solemn assurances" of the parties to assure itself that it was not viewed as a "rubber
stamp." Id. at 514. At the same time, however, the court recognized that the Department of
Justice represented the public interest in antitrust cases, id. at 513, and that, short of conducting the trial the parties were attempting to avoid, the court "must proceed in some
degree upon faith in the competence and integrity of government counsel," id. at 514. The
Nader Study Group considered the CIBA decree ineffective. THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 379-83.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal.
1969), affidsub noma. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United States
v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 440 (C.D. Cal. 1967), afl'd sub nom. Thrifty
Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
62. 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
63. See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
64. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. at 440.
65. 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affidper curiam sub noma. City of New York v.
United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
66. Id. at 620. The court based its opinion on the language of § 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 44. Accord United States
v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301, 1308 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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ministrative discretion of the Division enabled it to stretch its limited
resources to implement the enforcement policies of the executive
branch. Decisions within this administrative sphere were not subject to
judicial review.67 "The Government is the designated representative of
the public, and sound policy requires that it be free to conduct and
control its litigation in the public interest. ' 68 On the other hand, the
legal considerations that would justify court disapproval of a proposed
decree included the enforceability of the decree, the degree to which
the relief obtained was consistent with that asked for in the complaint,
the extent to which the decree jeopardized the rights of parties not
before the court, and whether the decree, as a whole, was in the public
69
interest.
Some courts, however, mindful of the Sam Fox Publishing directive, forsook any attempt to act as independent checks and approved
decrees in spite of doubts about their terms. In United States v. First
NationalBank of Lexington, 70 the court approved the proposed decree
even though it believed the government had made a "ninety percent
capitulation."' 7' Although the court questioned the decision by the government to settle the case, it found nothing to suggest that the Department of Justice had acted in bad faith 72 or had not conscientiously
represented the public interest. 73 Consequently, the court entered the
decree.
The last major settlement before the passage of the APPA involved the consent decree that ended the government's trio of suits
74
against the International Telephone & Telegraph Company (ITT).
Although the strength of the Antitrust Division's case was questionable75 and the terms of the settlement received general approval, 76 the
67. United States v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. at 620.
68. Id. at 621. See also United States v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 181, 184
(D. Conn. 1972) ("It is well established that the power to shape the remedy obtained by a
negotiated consent decree resides only in the hands of the government. The court's share of
the decisional load by its approval of a proposed decree consented to by the parties is a
limited one."). The Automobile Manufacturers court went on to quote the language from
Sam Fox Publishing. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. at 620.
70. 280 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
71. Id. at 263.
72. Id. at 264.
73. Id. at 263. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,692 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
74. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. (Hartford), 1971 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 73,666 (D. Conn. 1971); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. (Canteen), 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,619 (N.D. 1M. 1971); United States v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp. (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970).
75. The government lost the first two cases at trial (Grinnell and Canteen) and failed to
obtain a preliminary injunction in the third (Harford).
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alleged reasons for the settlement engendered controversy. 7 7 Public in-

terest advocate Ralph Nader sought unsuccessfully to intervene to con-

test the decree 78 and later to reopen the litigation after the decree had
been entered. 79 The questionable circumstances8 ° surrounding the ITT

settlements generated renewed Congressional concern for the integrity
of the Justice Department's consent decree program. 81

Congressional Intent Behind the APPA
By enacting the APPA, 82 Congress desired to "ventilate"8 3 the
consent decree process and foster greater public confidence in the gov-

ernment's antitrust enforcement program.84 In addition to a variety of
procedural mechanisms designed to open the negotiation and settlement process to public scrutiny,8 5 the legislation provides that before a
76. See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,872, at 95,867 (D. Conn. 1974).
77. See generally Note, supra note 47, at 603-06; Blake, Beyond the 177 Case,
HARPER'S MAG.,

June 1972, at 74. See infra note 80.

78. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1972),
aftd sub nom. Nader v. United States, 410 U.S. 919 (1973).
79. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. 74,872 (D.
Conn. 1974).
80. The Antitrust Division considered the potential "hardship" to ITT and its shareholders if the government forced divestiture of Hartford. In addition, the suggestion was
made, although no proof materialized, that the Nixon Administration settled the case in
return for political contributions during the 1972 presidential campaign. See Note, supra
note 47, at 604-05.
81. See House Hearings,supra note 17, at 38 (testimony of Sen. Tunney).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982).
83. Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 421 (statement of Sen. Tunney); 120 CONG. REc.
24,597 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney); id. at 36,341 (statement of Rep. Heinz); id. at
36,343 (statement of Rep. Jordan).
84. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6535 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; 119 CONG. REC. 3449 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
The APPA was enacted during the public upheaval following the Watergate affair and
the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon. Congress was also concerned that public
confidence in the antitrust enforcement program had been undermined by the circumstances
surrounding the decision by the Department of Justice to settle the IT&T cases. See supra
notes 74-81 & accompanying text.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d), (g) (1982). The government is required to publish all proposed decrees in the Federal Register at least 60 days before the effective date of the decree.
During this 60-day period, the government must also receive and consider any written comments relating to the proposed decree. These comments, along with the government's responses, are to be published in the Federal Register. In addition, the Antitrust Division
must prepare a competitive impact statement that contains, among other things, a description of the defendant's practices which gave rise to the alleged violation, an explanation of
the proposed consent decree, and a description and evaluation of the alternatives to the
proposal actually considered by the Department of Justice. The defendant is required to file
with the court a description of all contacts between the defendant or its representatives and
any officer or employee of the United States concerning the proposed decree. Contacts be-
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consent decree proposed by the government can be accepted and entered as a judgment, the district court must make a determination that
entry of the decree is "inthe public interest." 86 This provision, however, was but a codification of existing law. 87 The legislation did nothing to address the most vexing problem for the courts in the consent
decree process: the development of an appropriate standard by which
the court can analyze a proposed decree.
Two specific congressional intentions underlie the court review

provision of the APPA. First, the legislators clearly regarded the consent decree as a vital tool in the effort to enforce the antitrust laws and
therefore sought to preserve its viability.88 The consent decree is the

primary vehicle by which the Antitrust Division implements its enforcement program; at the time the APPA became law, approximately
eighty percent of the judgments obtained by the Antitrust Division
were consent decrees. 89 Far from attempting to alter the degree to
which the Antitrust Division utilized the consent decree, the legislation
sought to ensure that the consent decree procedure continued to serve
the antitrust enforcement effort.90 Congress recognized the crucial importance of the consent decree, particularly since its use allows the Department of Justice to allocate its resources to other antitrust
problems. 9 1 In sum, the APPA was designed to reinforce the fundatween the Department of Justice and counsel of record for the defendant are excepted from
this requirement.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) provides:
Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this
section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public
interest. For the purpose of such determination, the court may consider(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a
determination of the issues at trial.
87. See, e.g., supra note 26; see also United States v. Carter Prod., Inc., 211 F. Supp.
144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
88. Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 8; 119 CONG. REc. 3451 (1973) (statement of
Sen. Tunney).
89. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 84, at 6; S.REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; 119 CONG. REc. 3455 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Gurney). See generaly Posner, A Statistcal Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. &
ECON. 365 (1970).
90. Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 98 (statement of Sen. Tunney). For a commentary on some of the administrative factors that might influence the Antitrust Division's decision to settle, see House Hearings, supra note 17, at 150 (statement of Mr. Reycraft).
91. SENATE REPORT, supra note 89, at 5.
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mental enforcement policy of the Antitrust Division. 92 The cornerstone of that policy is the Division's desire to obtain either a litigated or
by ensuring
consensual judgment that adequately protects the public
93
trade.
on
restraint
eliminating
and
competition
healthy
Second, Congress did not authorize the courts to invent a new defi-

nition of the public interest; in making the public interest determination, the courts were directed to adhere to precedent and to define the

public interest in accordance with the antitrust laws. 94 However, the
very nature of the term "public interest" defies rigid standardization
and a variety of circumstances may influence a court's analysis of the
term. 95 Nonetheless, a court that reviews a proposed consent decree

statutes and case law for guidance in fashionmust look to the antitrust
96
ing its definition.

Any definition of the term "public interest," at least in an antitrust
context, must be derived from the underlying purpose of the antitrust
statutes. One of the primary purposes of the antitrust laws is to protect
the public from evils associated with monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade, and concentrations of economic power. 97 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that "the interest of the public
in the preservation of competition is the primary consideration." 9 8 The
92. 119 CONG. REC. 24,599 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
93. Id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 89, at 6; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 84, at 8.
94. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 84, at 11.
95. Social scientists have also recognized that the term "public interest" is amorphous.
The concept of the public interest plays a central role in discussions of public policy and public choice, even though no two people totally agree on the meaning of
that term. It is vacuous, deceptive, confused, and not very useful in explaining the
social order. It is questionable whether the public interest could even be reduced
to the sum of the pressures of all the conflicting, vociferous, contending interest
groups on the government to follow their own interests, or to what extent individuals can be relied on to decide their own destiny. The definition of the "public
interest" is thus both nebulous and changing with changing values.
Y. AHARONI, THE No-RiSK SocIETY 24-25 (1981).
96. House Hearings,supra note 17, at 43 (testimony of Sen. Tunney).
97. The Supreme Court has consistently articulated this position. See, e.g., United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966); Sugar Inst. Inc. v. United States, 297
U.S. 553, 597 (1936); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). A recent decision has
gone so far as to suggest that the only purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect competition.
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch. 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975). See also S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4295 ("the purpose
underlying Section 7 of the Clayton Act is 'to eliminate future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions' "). For a then contemporary history of the Sherman Act and its purposes, see A. H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE
SHERMAN LAW (1910). For a modern analysis of antitrust goals, see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
98. Paramount Famous Pictures Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930). The
Court was specifically referring to the Sherman Act.
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Attorney General is the sole representative of the public and thus the
public interest in antitrust matters. 99 Accordingly, the degree to which
the proposed consent decree provides the relief demanded by the Attorney General in the original complaint, and thus adequately remedies
the alleged anticompetitive acts, should be the primary public interest
consideration. °0 In fact, the first factor that the APPA enumerates for
court consideration is "the competitive impact of [the consent] judgthe
ment, including termination of alleged violations."10 1 Other factors
0 2 its
court may consider are the enforcement provisions of the decree,
duration, 03 alternative remedies actually considered,1° 4 and the consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a trial. 0 5 All
are, however, discretionary' ° 6 and the list is not
of these factors
107
exhaustive.
The statute also empowers the trial court to consider the impact of
the consent decree "upon the public generally."' 1 8 This provision
would appear to give the court the latitude to consider virtually any
interest in the public domain. The legislative history, however, compels a contrary conclusion. The reports of both the House and the Senate subcommittees that held hearings on the bill explicitly state that the
term "public interest" is to be defined in accordance with the antitrust
99. Buckeye Coal & Ry. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1925).
100. During its hearings on the APPA, the House Subcommittee received testimony that
the public interest was adequately served if the proposed consent decree met the antitrust
goal of opening markets to competition. Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division, testified: "Now, to me, that phrase [public interest] . . . means that
whether [sic] the proposed consent decree adequately remedies the competitive ills which we
perceived at the time we filed the complaint; in other words, does the proposed decree carry
out the purpose of the public interest as defined in the antitrust laws." House Hearings,
supra note 17, at 74. Other witnesses suggested that a significant portion of the public interest standard was met if the proposed consent decree obtained a remedy consistent with the
relief demanded in the original complaint. Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 50 (testimony
of Mr. Gregorich); House Hearings,supra note 17, at 181 (testimony of Mr. Menzines).
Even before the enactment of the APPA, courts which reviewed proposed consent decrees focused heavily on the degree to which the evils originally complained of by the Department of Justice were remedied by the proposed decree. See, e.g., United States v.
Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1969), af'd sub nom. City of New
York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (1982).
102. Id. This too was a factor considered by courts before the APPA. See, e.g., United
States v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1969), ,ffl'dsubnom. City
of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United States v. Carter Prod., Inc., 211
F. Supp. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (1982).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 89, at 8; House Hearings,supra note 17, at 45 (testimony of Sen. Tunney).
107. 120 CONG. REc. 36,344 (1974) (statement of Rep. Jordan).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (1982).
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laws. 109 The express goal of "[p]reservation of the antitrust precedent
rather than innovation in the usage of the phrase, 'public interest,'

[was], therefore, unambiguous." 110 No wide-ranging inquiry into a variety of potentially competing public interests is envisioned or required
by the statute."'1
Nonetheless, the APPA clearly directs the district court to make an
independent public interest determination before it enters a proposed
consent decree. The legislative history of the Act is replete with statements decrying what the legislators perceived as a tendency by the
courts to "rubberstamp" consent decrees.11 2 Congressional policy, affirmed by the APPA, undoubtedly favors a meaningful judicial review

of proposed consent decrees. However, a court is in an untenable position if it must respect congressional policy directives to adhere to antitrust precedent in defining the "public interest" and preserve the vitality of the consent decree process, and at the same time conduct an aggressive review of a proposed decree. Taken literally, 13the three
congressional policy directives are impossible to reconcile."
If the court uses all of the procedural and investigative mechanisms available to it under both the APPA and the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure," 14 the public interest inquiry would quickly become as
long and complex as the trial the parties are presumably attempting to
SENATE REPORT, supra note 89, at 3-5; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 84, at 11.
110. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 84, at 11. Congress was aware that any definition of a
phrase such as "public interest" would result from judicial construction within the context of
particular statutes. The legislation as originally drafted required the court to find that the
decree was "in the public interest as defined by law." The last four words were deleted from
the final draft of the bill to "clarify the intention not to change case law construing the
'public interest' in cases involving the antitrust laws or antitrust provisions of other laws."
Id. The lack of a definition for the term "public interest" was particularly troublesome to
Representative Hutchinson of the House Subcommittee. House Hearings,supra note 17, at
43, 74; Additional Views of Rep. Hutchinson, HOUSE REPORT, supra note 84, at 21-22.
111. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee, Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, expressed concern that a judge interpreting the legislation would feel compelled to conduct an extensive and broad-ranging inquiry. Senator
Tunney responded: "We don't want the judge to run a broad-ranging inquiry. That is not
the purpose." Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 107.
112. HousE REPORT, supra note 84, at 8; 119 CONG. Rc. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Tunney introducing the legislation); 120 CONG. REC. 36,341 (1974) (statement of Rep. McClory); id. at 36,344 (statement of Rep. Jordan).
113. Apparently, the legislators recognized the incongruity of the task given the district
courts. "The Committee recognizes that the court must have broad discretion to accommodate a balancing of interests. On the one hand, the court must obtain the necessary information to make its determination that the proposed consent decree is in the public interest. On
the other hand, it must preserve the consent decree as a viable settlement option." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 89, at 6. To say the court has broad discretion begs the issue; the court
still needs guidance.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f) (1982) provides:
In making its determination under subsection (e) of this section, the court may(1) take testimony of Government officials or experts or such other expert wit-

109.
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avoid. One of the significant factors that ordinarily contributes to the
settlement of antitrust cases is the desire of the defendant to avoid the
publicity and expense of a trial. Defendants faced with the prospect of

a detailed, time-consuming public interest inquiry may well prefer to
litigate the matter to its conclusion. Such a result would run afoul of
the specific congressional intent that the consent decree process be
preserved. 115
On the other hand, if the court substantially defers to the judgment
of the parties, particularly to the judgment of the Department of Jus-

tice, it runs the risk of being labeled a "rubber stamp." The most
troubling question for the court is how to realistically assess the essen-

tially administrative factors that may have influenced the Antitrust Division's decision to settle. Although the legislative history recognizes
that the settlement process could often include considerations not directly encompassed in the antitrust laws," 16 neither the statute nor the
history suggests how or to what extent the court should evaluate such

considerations.
Without guidance by Congress or the Supreme Court on the ap-

propriate extent of judicial inquiry or the standard the court should use
to make its public interest determination, and faced with amorphous
and conflicting concepts of the "public interest," the court is left to
nesses, upon motion of any party or participant or upon its own motion, as the
court may deem appropriate;
(2) appoint a special master and such outside consultants or expert witnesses
as the court may deem appropriate; and request and obtain the views, evaluations,
or advice of any individual, group or agency of government with respect to any
aspects of the proposed judgment or the effect of such judgment, in such manner as
the court deems appropriate;
(3) authorize full or limited participation in proceedings before the court by
interested persons or agencies, including appearance amicus curiae, intervention as
a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, examination of witnesses
or documentary materials, or participation in any other manner and extent which
serves the public interest as the court may deem appropriate;
(4) review any comments including any objections filed with the United States
under subsection (d) of this section concerning the proposed judgment and the
responses of the United States to such comments and objections; and
(5) take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem
appropriate.
The enumerated powers apparently did not expand on the courts' existing powers under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F.
Supp. 29, 42 n. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Zimmerman & Sullivan, Consent DecreeSettlements By
Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and
PrivateInterest, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163, 211; Note, supra note 47, at 631-32.
115. See supra notes 88-93 & accompanying text. Both the House and Senate reports
instructed trial judges to adopt the "least complicated and least time-consuming means possible" to gather the information needed to make the public interest determination. HouSE
REPORT, supra note 84, at 8; SENATE REPORT, supra note 89, at 6.
116. House REPORT, supra note 84, at 12.
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fashion its own definition of the "public interest" and formulate its own
test for evaluating the proposed decree. While the definition of the
"public interest" theoretically may be distinguishable from the standard a court uses to determine whether a particular decree is in the
public interest, the two are so inextricably interwoven that the standard
is inevitably subsumed in the definition developed by the court.
Courts attempting to develop a workable standard of review may
take one of two fundamental approaches. A court that views the enhancement of competition as the primary public interest may create a
threshold presumption in favor of a decree that remedies the anticompetitive practices outlined in the original complaint. A decree favored
by such a presumption would be rejected only if the third-party commenters" 7 or potential intervenors made a clear showing that the Department of Justice had failed in its role as the protector of the public
interest. Another court may choose a much more expansive definition
of the "public interest" and aggressively require the Department to justify each element of the proposed decree in answer to the objections
presented to the court by potentially affected third parties. The court
could then balance the interests alleged by the third parties against the
enforcement and administrative interests propounded by the Department of Justice. Under such a test, a court might reject the proposed
decree if, in its opinion, the Department had not adequately provided
for a majority of competing interests, even if those interests are not
even impliedly protected by the antitrust statutes.
Review Standards After the APPA
The lower court opinions issued since enactment of the APPA
demonstrate that the legislation has not fundamentally altered the role
of the courts in the consent decree process. Moreover, the relative roles
of the courts and the Department of Justice appear substantially
unchanged.
One of the first thorough treatments of the court's role in the
APPA consent decree process was presented by Judge Aldrich" 8 in
United States v. Gillette Co.' 9 After noting the impossible burden
placed on the court by the public interest provision of the APPA and
the policies set forth in its legislative history,120 Judge Aldrich defined
the role of the court:
117. The term "commenters" refers to those who, while not parties to the litigation, offer
comments on the proposed decree during the 60-day comment period. See supra note 85.
118. Now Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
119. 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975).
120. See supra notes 112-16 & accompanying text. The court further noted: "In this
situation the court cannot provide the best of all possible worlds. Just as the parties are
compromising, so in its process of weighing the public interest, must the court." United
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 715.
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It is not the court's duty to determine whether this is the best possible
settlement that could have been obtained, if, say, the government had
bargained a little harder. The court is not settling the case. It is determining whether the settlement achieved is within the reaches of the

lublic interest. Basically I must look at the overall picture not hypercriticaly, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's reducing
glass. 12

Although later courts have embraced the Gilette principle as a general
proposition, they have constructed two distinguishable analytical
frameworks within which to conduct their public interest analysis: the
balancing approach and the threshold presumption approach. Although a court's stated view of its role in the consent decree process is
similar under both approaches, the degree of deference that the court
affords the Department of Justice may be appreciably different.
The Balancing Approach
Some courts have chosen to balance the benefits to the public accruing from entry of the consent decree against the injuries to other
public and private interests alleged by third parties.1 22 Foremost
among the factors weighed by these courts is the degree to which the
relief obtained by the decree is consistent with that prayed for in the
original complaint. 2 3 The government has not been required to gain
all the relief originally sought, although it often will get virtually everything it asked for, so long as the relief provided by the decree achieves
the pro-competitive objective for which the suit was originally brought.
For example, in United States v. Gillette Co. ,124 although the government had sought complete divestiture of certain of the defendant's assets, 2 5 the decree fell short of accomplishing this goal. However, the
court felt that complete divestiture was not a realistic remedy 26 due to
the nature of the assets involved. 2 7 The court found that the relief
28
provisions of the decree were adequate to protect the public interest.1
The effectiveness of the relief provided by the decree has not, how121. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 716 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
122. See infra notes 123-39 and cases cited therein.
123. One court has cited the correlation between the relief obtained by the proposed
decree and that originally sought as a "highly significant factor" in its public interest assessment of a government settlement proposal. United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449
F. Supp. 1127, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
124. 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975).
125. Id. at 716.
126. The court specifically declined to consider the possibility that the government
might have lost the case had it gone to trial. The relief provided by the decree was only
tested on the assumption that the government would have won at trial. Id. at 716 n.2.
127. The assets that Gillette had acquired were foreign-owned. The acquired company
operated completely outside the United States. Id. at 716.
128. Id. at 717.
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ever, been the sole factor considered by the courts. For instance, the
Gillette court attached considerable weight to the fact that one of the
original opponents of the decree had withdrawn its objections after the
government had voluntarily modified the terms of the decree as a result
of the objections during the comment period.'2 9 The proposals advanced by the remaining opponent, a Gillette competitor, were not essential to the success of the decree. 130 Although there may have been
room for improvement in the terms of the decree, the court would not
draw fine lines between alternatives.' 3 ' In contrast, the court in United
States v. NationalBroadcastingCo. 132 attached significance to the fact
33
that all the commenters and opponents did not speak with one voice.1
While some objected that the decree did not eliminate anticompetitive
and
practices, others contended that the decree was overly restrictive
34
would in fact reduce NBC's effectiveness as a competitor.'
Other factors that have been given varying degrees of importance
in the balancing process include the amount of information available to
the court upon which it can base its public interest assessment, 35 the
extent to which all interested persons were afforded an opportunity to
fully air their views, 136 the adequacy with which the government responded to objections received during the comment period, 37 the po138
tential benefits to the public if the parties were forced to try the case,
and an absence of any suspicion or suggestion that the government did
not act in good faith or in the best interest of the public.' 39 While no
mechanical formula exists to weigh the foregoing factors, a challenger
who can raise serious doubt about the impact of any one of them on the
proposed decree may convince the court to attach significance to that
factor.
129. Id. at 716.
130. Id. at 717.
131. Id. "Gillette could always do something more. A point, however, comes where an
agreement ceases to be a compromise." Id. at 716.
132. 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
133. Id. at 1144.
134. Id.
135. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975).
136. United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1144 (C.D. Cal.
1978).
137. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975); United States
v. ARA Serv., Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,861 (E.D. Mo. 1979). Cf.United States v.
Central Contracting, Co., 531 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Va. 1982) (court insisted government comply to the letter with the provisions of the APPA). But cf. United States v. Bechtel Corp.,
648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981) (decree not invalid just because government failed to comply
with the APPA time limits for responding to objections).
138. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) %61,659 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
139. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975).
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The Threshold Presumption Approach

In contrast to courts that have adopted the balancing approach,
other courts have created a threshold presumption in favor of a proposed consent decree that the Department of Justice can show achieves
the original enforcement objective of the suit.I140 These courts, pointing
to the broad discretionary power of the Attorney General, have shown
substantial deference to a determination by the Antitrust Division that
the proposed relief would have a positive competitive impact. The burden is clearly on the objector to overcome the presumption and demonstrate that the decree is not in the public interest.
The threshold presumption approach was adopted in UnitedStates
v. Associated Milk Producers,Inc.,'141 the first opinion to consider the

effect of the APPA on judicial review of consent decrees. The court
based its presumption in favor of the proposed decree on the dictum in
Sam Fox Publishing142 that instructed courts to decline the invitation to
43
assess the wisdom of the government in negotiating consent decrees.
The court declined to read the APPA as a grant of additional judicial
power; 144 rather, it decided that its power was limited to the acceptance
or total rejection of the decree. 45 The court found that the competitive
impact of the decree would benefit the public and that none of the ob140. See infra notes 141-54 and cases cited therein.
141. 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aI'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied
sub noma. National Farmers' Org. v. United States, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
142. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961). See supra notes
36-37 & accompanying text.
143. The Associated Milk Producers court has been criticized by commentators for its
reliance on this pre-APPA standard. See, e.g., Zimmerman & Sullivan, supra note 114, at
210; Note, ConstructionandModiftcation ofAntitrust Consent Decrees.- New ApproachesAfter
the AntitrustProceduresandPenaltiesAct of 1974, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 296, 310 n.129 (1977).
While the spirit of the APPA lends some credence to these arguments, Congress explicitly
directed the courts to adhere to pre-APPA precedent when defining the "public interest."
See supra notes 94-96 & accompanying text. If Congress meant to retain the standard for
definition of the "public interest" while disapproving the then existing standards for court
review, its intention could hardly have been less clear. The Supreme Court pronouncements
in Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928), seesupra notes 18-19 & accompanying
text, and Sam Fox Publishing had been widely cited and followed by the lower courts. It is
inconceivable that Congress was unaware of these pronouncements or that it intended for
the courts to disregard the spirit of these two cases without even a hint of congressional
disapproval of them. Other post-APPA courts have relied on the dictum from Sam Fox
Publishing. See, e.g., United States v. National Broadcasting Co. 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1141
(C.D. Cal. 1978). But see United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 149
n.74 (D.D.C. 1982). See infra notes 156-71 & accompanying text.
144. [I]f the Congress wants the judicial branch to have more power than that implicit in a threat of total rejection of a proposed decree, such power must be authorized by legislation which is considerably broader in scope than that vested by the
newly enacted Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act or by existing law.
United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. at 42.
145. Id.
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jections advanced by the opponents compelled rejection of the

decree. 146
Other courts have implied that the presumption created in favor of
the proposed decree is less substantial. The court in United States v.
Agri-Mark, Inc. 147 suggested that the challengers of the decree were
required to show at minimum that an extensive judicial inquiry would
reveal significant flaws in the reasoning and conclusions of the Antitrust Division. 148 In United States v. CarrolsDevelopment Corp. ,149 the
court held that since the relief obtained by the decree would result in a
significant increase in competition, the opponents were required to
show that the Antitrust Division had acted improperly in rejecting possible alternatives to the relief agreed upon. 150 The decree in United
States v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc.151 was approved in the absence of
any showing by the objectors that "undermined" the conclusion of the
Antitrust Division that the proposed decree was in the public

interest. 152
The attitude of the courts that have adopted the threshold presumption approach to their public interest determination was concisely
summarized by the Ninth Circuit:
The balancing of competing social and political interests affected by
a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance,
to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government153has not
breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree.
However, the type of showing that might lead a court to conclude that
the Department of Justice has breached its duty is unclear, since no
court that has adopted this analytical approach has yet rejected a pro1 54
posed decree.
In summary, courts have routinely concluded, regardless of the analytical formula they adopt, that the APPA did not expand judicial
power. Rather, the Act provided a general statement of congressional
policy and alerted courts that they have ample power under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to enable them to make the required independent public interest determination. The courts are not blind to
the considerations presented by third parties, and they do not simply
146. Id. at 46.
147. 512 F. Supp. 737 (D. Vt. 1981).
148. Id. at 740. The challengers urged the court to withhold its acceptance of the decree
until the government furnished the court with exhaustive statistical and financial analyses.
149. 454 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
150. Id. at 1223.
151. 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,949 (D.D.C. 1976).
152. Id. at 69,183.
153. United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
154. By the same token, no proposed decrees have been rejected by courts adopting the
balancing analysis.
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"rubberstamp" decrees presented by the Department of Justice. As a
rule, however, courts do not actively intercede in consent decree negotiations conducted by the Antitrust Division. Instead, the courts stake
out a compromise position between these two extremes; their determination that a consent decree is in the public interest is their certification
that the terms of the settlement and the conduct of the Department of
Justice are within a range compatible with the public interest. There
appears to be no trend toward aggressive judicial determination of
whether a proposed decree is the one that might best serve society; such
a trend would undermine the congressional directive that courts preserve the viability of the consent decree process. 155 The sensible accommodation reached by most courts is deference to the economic,
social, and administrative judgment of the Department of Justice unless that judgment is clearly improper and disserves the public interest.
The Standard in United States v. American Tephone &
Telegraph Co.
A decidedly new standard of review was announced by the district
court that reviewed the consent decree proposed by the Department of
Justice in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
(AT&T).156 Relying heavily on its interpretation of the legislative history of the APPA, as well as on its characterization of the case as unusually important, the court read the APPA as authorizing an
expansive, broad-ranging judicial review. Moreover, the analytical
formula developed by the court sharply narrowed the discretionary authority of the Attorney General and instead vested in the court primary
responsibility and discretion to accommodate the myriad competing
interests.
The court determined that its duty was to "harmonize competitive
values with other legitimate public interest factors."' 57 Thus, rather
than adopting a passive review posture, the court viewed itself as an
aggressive, active participant in the formulation of the decree. The new
standard of review announced by the court reflected this posture: "If
the decree meets the requirements for an antitrust remedy-that is, if it
effectively opens the relevant markets to competition and prevents the
recurrence of anticompetitive activity, all without imposing undue and
unnecessary burdens upon other aspects of the public interest-it will be
155. See infra text preceding note 174.
156. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). For a criticism of the decree and its effects on one
state's regulatory policy, see Tannenbaum & Hurst, The AT&TAgreement: Reorganization
of the TelecommunicationsIndustry and Conflicts with Illinois Law, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 563
(1982).
157. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 153.
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approved." 158
This two-part test places a sizable burden on the Department of
Justice when it seeks to obtain approval of a proposed decree. The
Department faces the initial burden of demonstrating that the proposed
decree effectively increases competition and prevents the recurrence of
anticompetitive activity. Presumably this is the government's objective
in all its consent agreements, and the burden is one the Department of
Justice should bear each time it proposes a decree, regardless of the
analytical test applied by the court.
The second stage of the test, however, places an inordinate burden
on the government. The terms of the decree must survive the vigorous
scrutiny of the reviewing court as it attempts to harmonize a potentially
vast array of competing interests so that none is unduly or unnecessarily harmed. Thus, the court may readily strike down each economic,
administrative, or social determination made by the Department of
Justice if the assessment made by the Department does not precisely
conform to the assessment made by the court.
The AT&T court derived its vigorous scrutiny test from language
in decisions that had granted the government relief after the defendant
had lost at trial and been found liable for antitrust violations. 159 Since
by the express terms of the AT&T modification 160 the defendant admitted no liability, 161 this reliance seems fundamentally misplaced. 162 The
court acknowledged that it was not as free to exercise its discretion as it
would have been following a finding of liability, and that it could not
require the exact relief it would have imposed had liability been established. 6 3 However, the discretion actually exercised by the court at the
expense of the Department of Justice was not perceptibly different from
the discretion the court most certainly would have exercised had the
government won at trial.
The court pointed to two unique aspects of the AT&T case that it
158. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 150-51. The court relied primarily on United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1911).
160. Technically, the government was proposing a modification of the 1956 consent decree that had been entered in the United States District Court for New Jersey. After the
modification was presented in New Jersey, jurisdiction was transferred to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. United States v. American Te. & Tel. Co., 461
F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (D.D.C. 1978).
161. The text of the proposed modifications is published at 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REo. REP. (BNA) 110 (1982).
162. InAmerican Tobacco, the government had appealed to the Supreme Court because'
it was dissatisfied with the relief granted by the trial court. Thus, the government had won
the case but had not received from the trial court a remedy that it considered adequate. The
Supreme Court agreed and awarded the extra relief. United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184-88 (1911).
163. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 153.
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believed justified a special review standard. First, the court believed
that the sheer size of AT&T and the complexity involved in implementing the decree justified a special standard. The legislative history, however, reveals that Congress rejected several proposals that the APPA

contain a trigger mechanism and thus apply only to "important"

cases. 164 While by any standard AT&T was an "important" case, the
decree was nonetheless a compromise settlement. Judge Aldrich's adto
monition that "too much tillage can destroy the garden' 165 applies
66
"important" cases as well as to those that are more routine.
Second, the court cited the "unfortunate history"'167 of the AT&T

litigation as justification for the application of a rigorous review standard.1 68 However, the court did not point to any allegation or comment that questioned the good faith of the Antitrust Division. Instead,
the court suggested that the method chosen by the government to file
the original settlement proposal, 69 as well as certain conduct by the
Department of Defense during the course of the litigation,1 70 "did not
foster a sense of confidence"' 17 1 that the assessment of the settlement
could be left entirely to the litigants. While these are factors that the
court could properly consider in its assessment of the proposed decree,
they provide no compelling analytical justification for the creation of

the formidable review test formulated by the AT&T court.
Implications of the AT&T Standard
The review standard adopted by the AT&T court has potentially
164. When it was considering the APPA, Congress received several proposals for "trigger mechanisms" that would invoke the APPA provisions only in "important cases." Senate
Hearings, supra note 17, at 123 (testimony of Judge Loevinger), 198-99 (testimony of Dr.
Turner).
165. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975).
166. Judge Greene's position inAT&T may have been influenced by his belief that the
court had the power to approve a government decision to dismiss a case as well as a government decision to settle a case. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at
144 n.52. If the court had such power, its decision to reject a proposed decree would not
create the risk that the government could drop the case and thus obtain no relief. However,
since Judge Greene delivered his opinion in August 1982, two other courts, including the
Second Circuit, have decided that the APPA does not apply to decisions by the government
to drop a case. In re International Business Mach. Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 547 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
167. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 152.
168. See supra note 31. The circumstances surrounding the entry of the original AT&T
decree in 1956, particularly the collaboration between the Department of Defense and
AT&T, drew heavy congressional criticism. See 1959 HousE REPORT, supra note 4.
169. See supra note 160.
170. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1331 (D.D.C. 1981) (order
following hearing on the admissibility of certain evidence against the United States; the
document at issue had been prepared by the Department of Defense with significant technical assistance from AT&T).
171. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 153.
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broad ramifications for the consent decree program of the Antitrust Division. While there is no doubt that the reviewing court faces a difficult
task in attempting to reconcile the competing congressional policy directives that underlie the APPA,172 effective enforcement of the antitrust laws should clearly represent the court's primary consideration.
The enforcement program of the Department of Justice depends heavily1 7 3 on the continued use of the consent decree as an antitrust enforcement tool. In at least two ways, the standard adopted by the AT&T
court imperils the viability of the consent decree process.
First, the AT&T standard injects a substantial degree of uncertainty into the consent decree negotiation process. An attempt by the
court to harmonize competing interests and values so that none is unduly infringed inevitably places the court in a position of "secondguessing" the Department of Justice's assessment of the relevant competing public interests. The distinct possibility that any terms agreed to
by the parties might be altered by the reviewing court could place a
significant strain on the negotiations. The defendant has no assurance
that the reviewing court will agree with and approve the concessions
made by the Antitrust Division to induce the settlement.
Because the court has the duty to determine that the decree is in
the public interest, no analytical formula should preclude the possibility that the court will reject obviously inappropriate terms. However,
the more a court "tinkers" with the terms of the decree in an effort to
attain its perception of value harmony, the less relevant are the value
determinations made by the Department of Justice. Without assurance
that its good faith determination of the required balance between the
competing economic, social, and administrative interests will receive
court approval, the Antitrust Division lacks the negotiating muscle to
force a defendant to the bargaining table. Defendants may prefer to
take their chances in a full trial rather than conduct negotiations with
the trial judge using the Antitrust Division as an intermediary. If this
heightened uncertainty makes the consent decree process less attractive
to antitrust defendants, the government will be forced to try more cases
rather than settling by consent decree, and the antitrust enforcement
effort will necessarily suffer. This result is contrary to the express
174
wishes of Congress.
Second, the standard of review articulated and applied by the
AT&T court needlessly restricts the Department of Justice. The Attorney General has been statutorily entrusted with the duty to enforce the
antitrust laws' 75 and the Supreme Court has recognized that the per172. See supra notes 112-17 & accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 88-93 & accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 88-90 & accompanying text.
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1982).
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formance of this duty necessarily requires significant discretionary
power.' 76 The APPA was enacted by Congress to ensure that the Attorney General did not abuse the broad discretion vested in him.

Neither the statute nor its legislative history supports the proposition
that the court may substitute its views for those of the Department of
Justice on matters in which the Department is statutorily bound to represent the United States. Although Congress has the power 177 to enact

legislation that would supplant antitrust determinations made by the
Department of Justice, the APPA cannot be construed as an assign178
ment by Congress of any portion of that authority to the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the test announced in AT&T positions the court as the
primary arbiter of the public interest and
essentially relegates the De179
partment of Justice to an advisory role.

176. See supra notes 16-19 & accompanying text.
177. Commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
178. The Senate passed the APPA by a vote of 92-0 after a brief debate. 119 CONG.
REc. 24,605 (1973). It is inconceivable that the Senators intended to assign such expansive
power to the federal judiciary without serious consideration of the effect of such an assignment on the Department of Justice.
Representative Hutchinson expressed concern about the potential constitutional implications of an expansive reading by the judiciary of the public interest review provision of the
APPA. See Additional Views of Rep. Hutchinson, HousE REPoRT, supra note 84, at 21-22.
The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 margin, summarily affirmed the judgment of the district
court entering the decree in the AT&T case, Maryland v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 1240
(1983). Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White, dissented from the
summary affirmance. Recognizing that the APPA provided the district court little help in
formulating a public interest review standard, id. at 1242, Justice Rehnquist first questioned
as inappropriate the review standard adopted by theAT&T court. He correctly observed that
the "District Court seems to have assumed first that there was an antitrust violation and
second that it knew the scope and effects of the violation. But the parties have settled the
case and thereby avoided the necessity for such findings." Id. at 1242.
Justice Rehnquist also argued that the public interest review provision of the APPA
vested the district court with power that it had no constitutional authority to exercise. Citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
he argued that the decision to bring a lawsuit is committed to the executive branch by article
II and that a decision to settle such a suit and the terms of the settlement are political questions beyond the competence of the judiciary. Justice Rehnquist concluded that while Congress may enact a statute that ostensibly removes power from the executive and vests it in
the federal courts, the courts are without constitutional authority to exercise the power. Id.
at 1243.
179. This Note's observations on the standard of review formulated by the AT&T court
are in no way intended to criticize the court's skillful orchestration of the litigation. The
complexity of the issues, the enormous volume of evidence presented and the obvious resolve by each of the parties to vigorously contest virtually every step taken by the other
required the court to exercise assiduous control over every phase of the litigation. See
Kramer, Antitrust Today: The Baxterization of the Sherman and ClaytonActs, 1981 Wis. L.
REv. 1287, 1294-97.
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A Proposed Standard of Review
In the absence of any definitive guidance from most of the courts
of appeals or the Supreme Court, 180 the district courts must continue to
search for an acceptable analytical formula that will allow them to simultaneously accord the Department of Justice the discretion it needs
to enforce the antitrust laws, preserve the consent decree as a viable
enforcement tool, and discharge the court's statutory duty to determine
that a proposed decree is in the public interest. The public interest review tests developed thus far reveal a considerable difference of opinion as to the proper role the court should play in the consent decree
process. The following proposal suggests a workable standard of review that allows a reviewing court to reconcile the competing congressional policies it must implement, and gives the court an important, but
not dominant, role in the consent decree process.
When the Antitrust Division presents a proposed decree, it should
bear the initial burden of showing that the decree meets the essential
requirements of an antitrust remedy. The Division should demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the court that the proposed decree enjoins the anticompetitive activity of the defendant that prompted the initiation of
the suit, that the decree will prevent recurrence of the illegal activity,
and that the terms of the decree adequately provide for its enforcement.
This is not to suggest that the remedy obtained by the decree must exactly match the relief sought by the government in its original complaint. Rather, the Antitrust Division should be required to show that
the proposed decree achieves the antitrust enforcement objectives that
the Division originally pursued.
Once the government has successfully met its burden, it should be
entitled to a presumption that it has adequately considered the relevant
economic, social, and administrative factors and that the proposed decree is in the public interest. While the presumption must be rebuttable
if the court is to act as an independent check to ensure that the Antitrust Division has not breached its duty to perform in the public interest, this structure properly places the primary responsibility for
assessment of these factors on the Department of Justice.
Once the government has made a sufficient showing to give rise to
the presumption in favor of the decree, the burden should shift to the
challengers to make a clear and convincing showing that the decree
180. The Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of the APPA on the judicial review
of proposed consent decrees. Only two courts of appeals have rendered opinions that deal
with the role of the trial court and the appropriate standard of review. United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussed supra note 153 & accompanying text);
United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aftid,
534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. National Farmers' Org. v. United States, 429
U.S. 940 (1976) (discussed supra notes 141-46 & accompanying text).
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does not adequately protect the public interest and consequently
should be rejected by the court. The challengers may choose to attack
the decree on several grounds. First, if the challenger can show that the
government has not acted in good faith or that the proposed decree is
the result of collusion between the defendant and the government, the
court should automatically reject the decree. Even if the court determines that, objectively viewed, the terms of the proposed decree provide an adequate antitrust remedy, the court should refuse to enter the
decree if the conduct of the government is demonstrably improper. To
do otherwise would implicitly encourage such conduct and undermine
public confidence in antitrust enforcement.
A challenger also may attempt to show that the Antitrust Division
has failed to comply with the response provisions of the APPA. If the
challenger can show that the Division has unreasonably refused to respond to serious suggestions and comments made during the sixty-day
comment period, the court should delay its ruling on the decree and
order the government to respond. Failure by the government to adequately respond in the face of a court order would give the court ample
justification to reject the proposed decree. The court should resist the
temptation to assess the validity of the government's reasons for rejecting suggested alternatives and focus instead on the adequacy of the
government's response to the suggestion. The purpose of the comment
and response provisions of the APPA is to "ventilate" the consent decree process by affording interested parties the opportunity to comment
on a proposed decree and to ensure that the court has before it adequate information upon which to base its public interest determination. 8 1 The court can ensure that both these purposes are achieved by
requiring the Antitrust Division to respond in good faith to all bona
fide suggestions or proposed alternatives.
Finally, in those rare instances when a third party can show that
the terms of the decree irreparably harm an important economic or
constitutionally protected interest, the court may be justified in requiring a modification of the decree before it is entered. The court should,
however, carefully distinguish between harm caused by the terms of the
decree and economic harm that may occur due to the increased competition resulting from the entry of the decree. The increase in competition is, after all, the main objective of the consent decree. In addition,
the court should require the modification only when the third party
182
cannot adequately remedy the harm in a private action.
181. See supra notes 83-85 & accompanying text.
182. This two-part analysis allows the court to consider all but one of the factors which
the statute (15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982)) lists as appropriate for court consideration. The one
omitted factor, the possible benefit to the public of a determination of the issues at trial,
appears rather meaningless in light of the recent holdings that the APPA does not apply
when the Department of Justice decides to dismiss a suit. See supra note 166. Thus, while
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This two-stage analytical structure allows the court to successfully
accommodate the conflicting congessional policy directives that underlie the public interest provision of the APPA. The Department of Justice retains the power and discretionary latitude to carry out its
antitrust enforcement mandate. At the same time, the test sets out
identifiable boundaries that mark permissible limits within which the
government must exercise its discretion. Should the government exceed those limits, the court may properly reject the proposed decree in
order to protect the public interest. The consent decree is preserved as
a viable antitrust enforcement tool, the Antitrust Division and the defendant know the parameters of their negotiations, and the court, in
accord with congressional intent, is able to make an independent determination that the proposed consent decree is in the public interest.
Conclusion
Judicial review of proposed antitrust consent decrees provides a
useful assurance that the decree is in the public interest. However, the
primary duty to balance the relevant economic, social, and administrative factors that enter each public interest determination should remain
with the Department of Justice. The standard of review that the court
adopts must preserve the consent decree as a viable antitrust enforcement tool, allow the Department of Justice the flexibility it requires to
exercise its administrative discretion in negotiating consent decrees
and, at the same time, allow the court to make an independent determination that the proposed decree is in the public interest.
The standard of review proposed by this Note enables the reviewing court to accomplish each of these objectives. Once the Department
of Justice has shown that the decree meets the requirements of an effective antitrust remedy, the court should create a rebuttable presumption
that the decree is in the public interest. The challengers then must bear
the burden of overcoming the presumption if they wish the court to
reject the proposed decree. By acting as a check to ensure that the government has not breached its duty to perform in the public interest, the
court discharges its statutory responsibility under the APPA and successfully accommodates competing congressional policy directives.
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